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Abstract: An earthquake is an instantly occurring and unpredictable natural event. The 
potential and effects of earthquakes and other natural disasters on power systems are 
system faults. The faults are not only limited to the physical damage of power systems, but 
power quality disturbances may also take place. The Marmara Earthquake, which occurred 
in Turkey on Aug 17, 1999, caused death and catastrophe. After the earthquake, the 
Turkish Power System collapsed. This is the largest power blackout in Turkey in last twenty 
years. In this study, the impact of the Marmara earthquake on the Turkish power system 
are described and the Marmara Earthquake Blackout is examined in detail as regards the 
qualitative behavior of the power system. 
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1 Introduction 
Disasters are sudden, uncontrollable, and mostly unexpected events. According to 
the source, the classification of disasters has two broad categories: as natural 
disasters and man-made disasters. A lot of disastrous events may be classified 
under the broad category of natural disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, 
tornados, avalanches, volcanic eruptions, landslides, floods, etc. On the other 
hand, terrorism, war, nuclear power plant accidents, and airplane crashes are 
examples of man-made disasters [1]. The impacts of natural disasters are often 
greatly prolonged and exacerbated by disruptions to critical infrastructure systems. 
Critical infrastructure includes the electric power system, water, and transportation 
[2]. 
The potential effects of earthquake and other natural disasters on the power system 
are system faults [3]. The faults are not only limited to physical damage of power 
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severe power outages. The definition of a power outage, measured by its duration, 
appears to be similar among countries. A customer interruption in the U.K. is 
defined as a power cut lasting more than 3 minutes, while it is 1 minute in Sweden 
and less than 5 minutes in the U.S. There is no official definition with regards to 
the size of blackouts. A large blackout could refer to incidents that affect over a 
million people in various locations [4]. 
Large blackouts are initiated by a single event that gradually leads to cascading 
outages and eventually to the collapse of the entire system [5]. They are more 
complex than smaller ones as they often involve cascading events in which the 
primary failure triggers a sequence of secondary failures that lead to a blackout in 
a large area of the grid [4]. Therefore, a cascading failure is the main mechanism 
of large blackouts [6]. 
Recent cascading failures in several power systems in the world require urgent 
attention. The US-Canada region failure during the August 2003 blackout affected 
8 states in the U.S. and 2 provinces in Canada and left 50 million people in the 
dark. The Italian blackout of Sept 28, 2003 affected 57 million people. Around 
19,000 MW of electricity load was lost over a 277,000 square kilometer area. The 
Scandinavian blackout of Sept 23, 2003 affected approximately 5 million people, 
cutting off around 3,000 MW of generating capacity in Sweden, and 1,850 MW in 
Denmark [4]. The US/Canada blackout, the Scandinavian blackout and the Italian 
blackout have shown that the technical issues related to power system security 
cannot be completely overcome. It is necessary to investigate the failure, to 
analyze the cause leading to the blackouts and to identify potential blackouts [7]. 
Over the last twenty years, there have been many significant blackouts for various 
reasons such as natural disasters, supply shortages, the restructuring of the 
electricity industry, etc. Apart from the news reported in the media, sources of 
information on blackouts are limited. However, anatomies of the blackouts have 
been studied by researchers in literature [2], [5], [7-12]. 
An earthquake with a moment magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter scale occurred on 
August 17, 1999 at 03:02 a.m. and affected the northwest of Turkey. The 
earthquake is called the Marmara Earthquake. After the earthquake, the Turkish 
Power System collapsed. 
Although this was the largest power blackout in Turkey in last twenty years, the 
impacts of the earthquake on the power system and the causes of the large 
blackout have not been investigated in literature. The main goal of this paper is to 
investigate the Marmara Earthquake Blackout. The blackout is studied for its 
impact on the Turkish Power System in the context of the location and importance 
of the earthquake region and the theory of power system disturbances. Acta Polytechnica Hungarica  Vol. 7, No. 2, 2010 
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2 The  Earthquake  Region 
On August 17, 1999 an earthquake with an epicenter near Izmit became the most 
terrifying disaster in recent Turkish history. The impact of the earthquake on the 
population and the economy was mainly felt in seven cities in the Marmara 
Region (Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, İstanbul, Bolu, Bursa, and Eskisehir). The 
death toll was 18,373, another 48,901 people injured. Reportedly 93,000 housing 
units and 15,000 small business units collapsed or were badly damaged [13]. 
The Marmara Region, where the major impact of the earthquake occurred, is very 
important to the Turkish economy, both in terms of production and consumption 
capacities. This area accounts for 23% of the total population of Turkey. The 
seven cities, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, Istanbul, Bolu, Bursa, and Eskisehir, 
represent 33.4% of the Turkish GDP; further these cities produce 46.7% of total 
industry value added [14]. The Marmara region, mainly Kocaeli, Sakarya, and 
Yalova, is the center of the Turkish oil, textile, automobile, petrochemical, and tire 
industries. With an average income level per person that far exceeds the national 
average, the region also plays a very important role in terms of domestic 
consumption demand. Turkey main heavy industry is located in the Marmara 
Region. Figure 1 shows the location of the earthquake region on the map. 
 
Figure 1 
Location of the Earthquake Region 
The region plays an important role regarding electricity consumption. At the end 
of 1999, the region used 32.2% of Turkey’s electricity, which was 28 Billion kWh 
per anum [16]. In Table 1, the key indicators of the region are listed; the 
population, GDP and electricity consumption, and their percentages as a share of 
the total in Turkey. 
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Table 1 
The Earthquake Region Indicators and Rations in Turkey 
3  The Power System Characteristics 
At the time of the Marmara Earthquake, the operational structure of the Turkish 
Power System was as follows. In 1999, TEAS (the Turkish Electric Generation 
Transmission CO.) was responsible for the generation and transmission of 
electricity throughout the country. Voltage levels of “National Grid Transmission 
System” were 154 kV and 380 kV. The length of the Turkish Power System 
transmission lines totaled 41,880 km, and the transformer capacities equaled 
53,766 MVA, while 13,700 km and 18,470 MVA belonged to 380 kV [15]. An 
illustration of National Grid Transmission System for Turkey at 380 kV is 
displayed in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
View of 380 kV Transmission System 
City  Population  GDP ($)  %  Consumption (MWh)  % 
Bolu  554,473 184,628  1.0  730,288 0.8 
Bursa 1,991,811  6,767,332 3.7  4,544,886  5.2 
Eskisehir 662,599  2,275,641 1.2  849,913  1.0 
Istanbul 9,382,894  40,506,151 21.8  16,509,300  18.8 
Kocaeli 1,200,953  7,818,017  4.2  4,278,546 4.9 
Sakarya 736,223  2,028,927  1.1  744,253  0.8 
Yalova  166,617 715,127  0.4  595,927 0.7 
Total 14,695,570  60,295,823 33.4  28,253,113  32.2 Acta Polytechnica Hungarica  Vol. 7, No. 2, 2010 
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The system was observed and managed by five regional operation divisions of 
National Load Dispatch Department. These were; 
•  Northeast Anatolia (NEA) 
•  Northwest Anatolia (NWA) 
•  West Anatolia (WA) 
•  Mid Anatolia (MA) 
•  Southeast Anatolia (SEA) 
Each regional operation division was responsible in its region for load distribution 
and the operation of the interconnected system components. The operation 
divisions sent monthly reports to the National Load Dispatch Department. The 
connections among the regions are shown in Figure 3 [16]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Connections among the Regions 
In 1999, the installed power in Turkey was 26.1 GW. 60% was thermal, and 40% 
was from hydroelectric sources. 24.3% of the installed capacity came from lignite-
fueled power plants. The most important of these were Afşin Elbistan (1,360 
MW), Soma (1034 MW), Seyitömer (600 MW), Yatağan (630 MW), Yeniköy 
(420 MW) and Kemerköy (630 MW). Natural gas-fueled power plants, which 
accounted for the second major share in Turkey, produced 23.5% of installed 
capacity. The Power plants of Ambarlı (1,350 MW), Hamitabat (1,200 MW) and 
Bursa (1,432 MW) were natural gas-fueled power plants of the largest capacity 
[15]. All of them are in the Marmara region. 
Figure 4 shows the monthly instantaneous peak loads for 1999. The instantaneous 
peak load of Turkish Power System was 18,938 MW at 17:30 on 8 December. 
Figure 4 also demonstrates the load distribution over the regions of the Marmara 
Earthquake, which was in month of August [15-17]. It was observed that the 
instantaneous peak load was higher in the earthquake region NWA than in the 
other regions. 
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Months MW
January 17,137
February 17,392 
March 17,671 
April 16,320 
May 15,758 
June 16,042 
July 17,088 
August 17,063 
October 16,063 
September 16,818 
November 18,170 
December 18,938 
Figure 4 
Monthly Instantaneous Peak Loads and load distribution over regions in August, 1999 
Table 2 shows the hourly load values on the third Wednesdays of each month in 
1999 [17]. In August, the minimum hourly load was 10,300 MW. Except in 
January, the minimum hourly load range was between 10,000 and 12,600 MW. 
However, the maximum load range was between 14,000 and 17,600 MW. As a 
result, the daily load fluctuation in 1999 was between 4,000 and 6,000 MW. 
Table 2 
The Hourly Load Values on the Third Wednesdays of Each Month in 1999 
The Hourly Load (MW) Date 
Minimum  Maximum
20 January   8,300 12,200
17 Februray  11,300  16,800 
17 March  11,600  17,600 
21 April  10,400  15,400 
19 May  10,000  14,000 
16 June  10,400  15,300 
21 July  11,200  16,200 
18 August  10,300  16,000 
15 September  10,500  15,000 
20 October  10,250  16,400 
17 November  11,750  17,750 
15 December  12,600  17,750 
NEA
8%
NWA
40%
WA
25%
MA
12%
SEA
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4 The  Earthquake  Impact  on the Power System 
The Marmara Earthquake occurred on August 17 at local time 03:02 am. After the 
first shock, the Turkish Power System was badly affected and the system 
experience a blackout, except for some regions, WA and a region isolated from 
national grid, which were supplied by international connections (Bulgaria, 
Georgia and Iran) [16]. Therefore, except for WA, the thermal and hydroelectric 
power plants were out of service. 
The time period of the minimum load drawn on the Turkish power system is 
usually between 02:00-07:00 am. This is a characteristic of Turkish power system. 
The Marmara Earthquake occurred during this period. Some of the daily load 
curves of August 1999 are presented in Figure 5 [17]. 
 
Figure 5 
Daily Load Curves belonging to August 1-9, 1999 
The generation-consumption balance of the regions on the day before the 
earthquake is given in table 3 [16]. NWA was the highest in both generation and 
consumption. In additional, WA was the region of second-highest consumption 
and was balanced in generation–consumption. 
Table 3 
Generation-Consumption of The Regions at the Time of Minimum Load on 16 August 1999 (MWh) 
Region Generation  Consumption 
NWA 3,978  3,588 
WA 2,234  2,574 
SEA 2,622  1,420 
MA 441  1,069 
NEA 385  566 
Total 9,682  9,217 B. Oral et al. The Impacts of Natural Disasters on Power Systems: Anatomy of the Marmara Earthquake Blackout 
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At the time of the earthquake, the Turkish power system was supplied heavily by 
thermal plants. Figure 6 shows the power flow between the regions [18]. In 
general, the power flow of the Turkish power system is from the east regions, 
which have important hydroelectric power plants, to the west regions, where there 
are extensive industrial facilities. However, at the time of the earthquake, the 
power flow was not in that direction. The Marmara Earthquake occurred in the 
summer of 1999. The summer was dry, the water levels of the hydroelectric power 
plants were low, and the water was used for irrigation. At the same time, take or 
pay agreements had to be applied for natural gas power plants; therefore, the 
natural gas power plants were on service at the earthquake time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
The Power Flow between the Regions at the Minimum Time Range on 17 August 1999 
Consequently, the Marmara Earthquake occurred, 
•  at the time range of minimum load on the Turkish Power System; 
•  in Northwest Anatolia, which was the most developed region regarding the 
generation-consumption of electricity, industry and population density; 
•  during a situation when the power flow was to the east from the west. 
When the earthquake occurred, the load of the NWA suddenly dropped. The 
region drew more than 35% of the total Turkey load. Excluding the isolated 
regions, the total drawn load of MA, NEA and SEA was roughly 4.0 GW. The 
load of WA was roughly 3.0 GW and 30% of the total drawn load of Turkey. 
Figure 7 shows the change to the system load during the earthquake [18]. 
Therefore, the load of the Turkish power system was suddenly rejected. As a 
result of disturbances to the power system, cascading failures occurred in the 
system. 
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Figure 7 
Sudden load reduction of Turkish Power System in the Marmara Earthquake 
During the earthquake, the NWA power demand was covered by Hamitabat, 
Ambarli, and Unimar ve Bursa natural gas power plants. At the same time, the 
region exported power to MA. The power flow was roughly 1.2 GW [18]. The 
power connections were provided between NWA and MA by power transmission 
lines of 380 kV. 
380 kV Osmanca and Adapazarı transformer substations, which are located 
between NWA and MA regions, and power transmission lines of NWA region 
were affected by the earthquake. Therefore, transformer substations of NWA were 
switched off, and the region1s load was suddenly lost. 
The effect of a sudden loss of demand can develop the following possible results 
on the power system: 
•  System frequency rise, 
•  System voltage rise, 
•  Transmission overload, 
•  Transient instability, 
•  System oscillations. 
These actions affect power system for particular instants. These time intervals can 
be from 1/10 seconds to seconds for system frequency and voltage; however, they 
can be from seconds to minutes for transmission overload and system oscillations 
[3]. 
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Figure 8 
Power System of Northwest Anatolian Region (1999) 
At the time of the earthquake, the NWA transmission and distribution lines were 
out of service because of pylon breaking and short circuits in the power lines. The 
substations in the severely affected earthquake regions were opened by buchholz 
relays. In addition, medium voltage and low voltage substations suffered damage. 
Consequently, immediately after the earthquake, the region load was rejected. At 
the same time, connection substations between NWA and MA suffered damage, 
when power was flowing from NWA to WA. 
The rate of frequency change after the load rejection depends on the inertia 
constant and generation – load imbalance [19]. In other words, the power system 
frequency is directly related to the rotational speed of the generators supplying the 
system. There are slight variations in frequency as the dynamic balance between 
load generation changes. The size of the frequency shift and its duration depend 
on the load changes. Frequency variations that go beyond the accepted limits for 
normal steady-stead operation of the power system can be caused by faults such as 
a large block of load being disconnected, or a large source of generation going off-
line on the bulk power transmission system [20]. At the instance of the load 
rejection, the breaker opens and the current rapidly goes to zero. The voltage drop 
over the generator internal impendence becomes zero, as well, causing a sudden 
step change in generator output voltage amplitude and phase. When running as a 
generator connected to the grid, the electrical frequency of the generator is 
synchronized to the grid frequency [19]. 
After the blackout, the power system restoration started quickly and it was 
recovered between 03:30 and 08:30 am. Normal operating conditions of the power 
system were provided with the exception of the earthquake region. During the 
system restoration process, an aftershock earthquake occurred in Duzce at 08:54 
am. Because of this earthquake, the 380 kV lines between MA and NWA went out 
of service. Therefore, the Turkish Power System was interrupted again, with the 
exceptions of the regions powered by international connections and the Black Sea 
region. At 14:00 pm of the same day, the power system recovered and put into Acta Polytechnica Hungarica  Vol. 7, No. 2, 2010 
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service at normal operating conditions except for the region seriously affected by 
the earthquake [18]. 
Conclusions 
Earthquakes are natural, sudden, unpredictable, uncontrollable and short-lasting 
natural events with destructive effects. The earthquakes not only damage the 
power system, but also make disturbances on power system. An earthquake 
occurred on August 17, 1999 in Turkey, and the Turkish Power System was 
affected by this earthquake and the power system collapsed. 
•  The blackout affected the biggest industrial and electricity consuming region 
of Turkey. 
•  The earthquake occurred at the time range of the minimum load on the 
Turkish Power System while the power flow was to east from west and the 
power system was operated predominantly by thermal power plants. 
•  When the earthquake occurred, the region load, which was more than 35% of 
the total load in Turkey, was suddenly rejected. 
Because of the effect of this sudden loss of demand and cascading failures, 
disturbances on the power system occurred. As a result of these disturbances, 
instant frequency and voltage increased and a large blackout happened on the 
Turkish Power System. After twelve hours, the Turkish Power System recovered 
to its normal operating conditions. 
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